


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



Air University

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CONTENTS

[A Thousand Sites To Be Inspected For WMD](#)

[U.S. Lost Track Of Iraq Warheads Powell Cited At UN, Myers Says](#)

[Arms Scientists Said To Have Fled To Syria](#)

[Warning To North Korea On Nuclear Arms](#)

[Top Iraqi Scientist Surrenders To U.S.](#)

[U.S. Soldiers Find Decontamination Bunker Complex](#)

[Chemical Weapons: A Hot Story's Elusive Proof](#)

[Tests Point To Domestic Source Behind Anthrax Letter Attacks](#)

[The Poisons That Came From The West](#)

[U.S. May Have To Allow Others To Inspect Iraqi Arms](#)

[U.S. Search For Illegal Arms Narrowed To About 36 Sites](#)

[US hunts for Dr Germ and Mrs Anthrax](#)

[Hussein's Top Science Adviser Surrenders to U.S. Marines](#)

[Nuclear Scientist Surrenders](#)

[Israelis Get The All Clear To Stow Their Gas Masks](#)

[With Bioterror Fears Rising, An Expert Winds Up On Trial](#)

[U.S. Army Finds Mobile Labs Buried Near Karbala, Iraq](#)

Washington Times

April 12, 2003

Pg. 7

A Thousand Sites To Be Inspected For WMD

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

U.S. military specialists in Iraq have inspected about 12 possible chemical, biological and nuclear weapons sites in Iraq and have a list of 1,000 sites to be checked in the coming days now that organized Iraqi military resistance has collapsed.

Defense officials said members of a 200-soldier team, the Army's 75th Intelligence Exploitation Unit, are working on finding Iraq's banned weapons.

Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said yesterday a special "sensitive site exploitation" team recently checked a facility at Al Qaim and is waiting for test results.

Al Qaim has a fertilizer plant that U.S. officials suspect could be part of Iraq's chemical arms program. It also is the location of a facility that in the past refined uranium ore, which could be part of Iraq's nuclear arms program.

A defense official said the 75th is a combat support unit that is working under the U.S. Central Command to investigate chemical and biological weapons sites, to recover and use Iraqi documents on the subject, and to find prisoners of war.

The group also provides interrogators who can question captured Iraqis.

"They're looking for actionable intelligence on anything to do with [weapons of mass destruction] and POWs," the defense official said.

In addition to the 75th, another large team of intelligence and weapons specialists is in the Middle East waiting to go to Iraq once the country is stabilized, the official said.

In Vienna, the U.N. nuclear agency said it has asked the United States to secure Iraq's nuclear facility at Tuwaitha, about 11 miles south of Baghdad.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in a statement that until inspectors return to Iraq, "the U.S. has responsibility for maintaining security at this important storage facility."

U.S. Marines near the research center reported high levels of radioactivity and found drums containing radioactive material.

A Marine Corps combat engineering unit uncovered an underground network of laboratories, warehouses and bombproof offices beneath the 70-building complex.

Three warehouses containing some 2,500 barrels of uranium that could be enriched to make nuclear weapons were found unguarded at Tuwaitha, where looters sacked a residential compound in the complex, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday.

Fox News reported yesterday that between seven and 15 Iraqi military vehicles are being tested for chemical and biological weapons on suspicion of being mobile weapons laboratories.

A refrigerated military truck at a construction site also is being probed as a possible biological weapon component.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said searching for weapons is not as high a priority as defeating the remaining pro-Saddam military and guerrilla forces.

"The first task is to prevail in this conflict and to stop the forces of Saddam Hussein in the areas that they continue to operate in and to reduce the violence," Mr. Rumsfeld said.

Other priority missions, including finding banned weapons, will follow, he said.

Mr. Rumsfeld said those searching for weapons are seeking out Iraqis who can provide information on the locations of hidden arms. The CIA and the Pentagon have launched a program to offer cash rewards to Iraqis who can help locate banned weapons.

Mr. Rumsfeld said he expects the search for weapons to be difficult because the Iraqis were good at hiding banned weapons from international inspectors.

"We are not going to find them, in my view, just as I never believed the inspectors would, by running around seeing if they can open a door and surprise somebody and find something because these people have learned that they can live in an inspection environment — the Iraqis did; they functioned in that environment, they designed their workplaces to do that," he said. "Things were mobile, things were underground, things were in tunnels, things were hidden, things were dispersed."

Several suspicious materials have been found so far, including an explosives factory south of Baghdad, where thousands of vials of white powder were found.

A training center for nuclear, chemical and biological warfare was uncovered recently in Iraq's western desert.

Numerous chemical protection suits also have been found at several military facilities.

A defense official said dual-use equipment and other goods capable of producing unconventional weapons were found there.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030412-51448615.htm>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Bloomberg.com
April 11, 2003

U.S. Lost Track Of Iraq Warheads Powell Cited At UN, Myers Says

Washington -- The U.S. military lost track of an Iraqi missile unit thought to possess warheads armed with biological agents, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard Myers said.

Secretary of State Colin Powell had disclosed intelligence information on the missile brigade in his Feb. 5 presentation to the United Nations designed to win support for military action to disarm Iraq. The warhead claim was among details Powell disclosed that were unrelated to previous UN inspection findings.

Military units have yet to discover stocks of chemical and biological agents, or weapons, facilities and mobile laboratories Iraq was said to possess in violation of UN resolutions. Samples of suspected banned weapons agents seized by U.S. troops in Iraq are being analyzed in the United States.

"It was a correct report," Myers said of Powell's claim. "I went back and did my research, it's absolutely right. And we tracked it as far as we could track it, and that's the end of that," Myers said, adding he didn't know what happened to the unit.

Powell said the brigade and missiles were moved to the western desert of Iraq from near Baghdad to avoid detection by the UN inspectors.

Air Armada

The U.S. has an air armada over Iraq, with picture-taking drones, ground surveillance and electronic eavesdropping planes to track suspected chemical and biological weapons sites and Iraqi military units. The aircraft have flown more than 2,400 surveillance missions as of yesterday.

U.S. special operations forces also conducted raids in western Iraq against suspect sites, defense officials said.

The missing brigade led at least one expert to suggest the Bush administration exaggerated the threat of weapons of mass destruction to justify a military invasion.

"Some of the intelligence cited by officials before the war seems to have been based on defector information that thus far has not proven accurate," Joseph Cirincione, director of the nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said in a fact sheet this week that highlighted the Powell claim.

"Search teams have gone to western and southern Iraq where they believed weapons were stored but have yet to find any," he wrote.

Powell at the UN said "we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations in western Iraq." The launchers and warheads were to be moved every one to four weeks to avoid detection, Powell said.

Dampened Expectations

The administration has been lowering expectations that weapons caches would be found soon, citing the continued fighting in Baghdad and in northern Iraq.

Rumsfeld said U.S. forces are "fighting a war," and the search for banned weapons is a secondary goal.

Rumsfeld, asked what he could guarantee U.S. troops would find that UN weapons inspectors failed to uncover, cited Powell's UN presentation as evidence that proved the U.S. case.

"Things were mobile, things were underground, things were in tunnels, things were hidden, things were dispersed," Rumsfeld said. "Now, are we going to find that? No. It's a big country. What we're going to do is we're going to find the people who will tell us that, and we're going to find ways to encourage them to tell us that."

Myers at a March 4 breakfast meeting with reporters said "the goal will be to disarm Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and delivery systems -- that's the goal."

The Iraqi regime "was playing a great shell game right now," Myers said of what's been described as an elaborate "denial and deception" program. "That shell game would obviously, with forces on the ground, come to a halt and I think people would come out and say 'here it is. We don't want to touch it either.'"

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Washington Times
April 12, 2003
Pg. 1

Arms Scientists Said To Have Fled To Syria

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

Some of Iraq's top weapons scientists already have fled their country and are in Syria, from where they may seek political safety in France, administration sources said yesterday.

The officials said among those believed to have made it to Syria are Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash and Rihab Taha, both top scientists in Iraq's biological-weapons program. The administration sources said there are intelligence reports that one, or both, made it to Damascus.

Mrs. Taha is a British-trained microbiologist, who led Iraq's drive to cultivate and weaponize deadly anthrax. Nicknamed "Dr. Germ," she is believed to hold vast knowledge concerning all of ousted Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's development of weapons of mass destruction.

Mrs. Ammash has been nicknamed "Mrs. Anthrax" by Western reporters. She has been photographed at Saddam's Cabinet meetings, and at a meeting with his son, Qusai, who ran most of Iraq's military and security organizations. The two women are notable not only for their expertise in weaponizing germs, but also because they both attained senior positions among the male-dominated Ba'ath Party.

Mrs. Ammash's picture and name were listed yesterday by the U.S. Central Command as one of 55 most-wanted Iraqis for possible war-crimes charges. Mrs. Taha was not listed, although she is wanted for questioning.

They are of great potential value to American weapons inspectors who want leads on where Saddam has hidden his weapons of mass destruction.

One administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said there are intelligence reports that Iraqi weapons scientists are seeking safety in France. Paris aided Saddam's nuclear-weapons program, helped build Baghdad's air-defense network and vehemently opposed the ongoing war that toppled the dictator.

U.S. officials declined to put a number on how many Iraqi weapons scientists have entered Syria, but estimated it is fewer than 10 at this point.

Allied forces set up checkpoints early in the war at crucial highway intersections. But military officials say it is impossible to stop every car and search it.

There have been two days of intense firefights between U.S. troops and Iraqi forces in the town of Qa'im, which lies just 20 miles from the Syrian border and is a key juncture in the escape route from Baghdad to Damascus.

During the inspection regime by the United Nations that ended before the war started March 19, inspectors failed to gain unfettered access to any Iraqi weapons scientists except one biological-warfare researcher.

Reports that Iraqi scientists have left Baghdad for Syria comes as the U.S. Central Command announced yesterday a most-wanted list of 55 Ba'ath Party leaders. The "wanted posters" came in the form of a deck of cards — this one with 55 cards, each showing a picture of an Iraqi fugitive. Saddam, who may have been killed in a Monday air strike, is the ace of spades.

The current government in Syria, like Saddam's regime, was founded as a hard-line dictatorship. Since the war started, Syria has purportedly come to Baghdad's aid in several ways, including shipping night-vision military equipment and allowing suicidal non-Iraqi Arabs to travel through Syria to Iraq to attack the allies.

Now, Syria is providing a haven to Iraqi Ba'athists, including some weapons experts. The exodus began with the family members of Saddam's regime. But as Army soldiers and the Marines got closer to Baghdad last week, regime figures started showing up in Syria.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has warned Syria several times publicly to stop helping Saddam's defeated regime and did so again yesterday.

"They have allowed people to come out of that country into their country and either stay or transit. None of these things are helpful," he said.

Mrs. Taha is married to Iraq's oil minister, Lt. Gen. Amir Rashid Mohammed Ubaydi. During the U.N. inspections regime of the 1990s, inspectors interviewed Mrs. Taha frequently. A loyal Ba'athist, she often responded angrily, and in one instance threw furniture.

Gen. Ubaydi is on the most-wanted list of 55.

Mrs. Taha ran Iraq's supersecret biological-warfare program at a research lab in the town of Hakam beginning in the mid-1980s.

Many senior Iraqi ministers, generals and Ba'ath Party members suddenly disappeared on Monday from Baghdad two days before the city fell to the U.S.-led coalition. The vanishing act came hours after a U.S. Air Force B-1B dropped four 2,000-pound bombs on a building in Baghdad suspected of holding Saddam, his sons, Uday and Qusai, and other officials.

The target was a safe house for the Iraqi Intelligence Service in the western Mansur neighborhood of Baghdad, behind the popular al Saa restaurant.

"There were two places. One was a restaurant, and one was a house nearby," Mr. Rumsfeld said yesterday. "And the question is, who was in what, if anybody? And the answer is, do we have ground truth there? And the answer is no."

The four satellite-guided bombs destroyed a row of buildings, and left a deep crater. Gen. Richard B. Myers, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, said U.S. forces will eventually examine the bombing site located in the Ba'ath Party stronghold. But for now, occupying troops have more important missions. "I think our priorities now would not be to be digging in rubble," said Gen. Myers. The CIA received human intelligence that Saddam went into the building and did not come out before the bombs destroyed it.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030412-80035992.htm>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times
April 12, 2003

Warning To North Korea On Nuclear Arms

By Michael Wines

ST. PETERSBURG, Russia, April 11 — A top Russian diplomat said today that a nuclear-armed North Korea was against Russian national interests and that the Kremlin would re-evaluate its opposition to international penalties should the North Koreans develop nuclear weapons.

The statements, by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov, who was the Kremlin's emissary to North Korea during a diplomatic mission in January, amounted to a warning to North Korea that patience was ebbing in one of the few nations that has offered it sympathy during a five-month nuclear crisis with the United States.

North Korea has said it will regard international penalties as an act of war, a position Russia has previously endorsed even as it has tried informally to mediate the nuclear dispute.

But in an interview with the Interfax news service, Mr. Losyukov said Russia would continue to oppose international penalties against North Korea's nuclear program only "as long as our North Korean colleagues maintain common sense."

Should North Korea begin producing weapons, he said, "Russia will have to seriously consider its position, as the appearance of nuclear weapons in North Korea and the possibility of using them close to our borders goes categorically against Russia's national interests."

"If the issue in North Korea becomes one of nuclear weapons development or, worse, of the possibility of using them, this presents us with a very serious choice."

Mr. Losyukov's comments reflected not only growing Russian concern over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, but perhaps concern that the United States' and Britain's apparent triumph in the war in Iraq might embolden the White House to consider military action against North Korea.

Since the United States confronted the North Koreans last autumn with evidence that they were secretly conducting a nuclear weapons program in defiance of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, North Korea has abrogated the treaty and restarted a reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.

North Korea's leaders have insisted that only direct talks with the United States can persuade them to abandon their program, but the White House has argued just as adamantly that the nuclear program is an international problem requiring global pressure and multilateral talks.

The United States has said it has no plans to attack North Korea and that it believes that the standoff over its nuclear program can be resolved in talks. But it also has taken a number of actions, such as airing a recent proposal to move American troops in South Korea out of range of North Korean artillery, which the North has denounced as preparations for war.

The Bush administration's top arms proliferation official, Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton, said this week that rogue states like North Korea should take a lesson from the events in Iraq.

Mr. Losyukov said Russia feared that a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula would affect Russian territory and endanger Russian citizens living along the short border it shares with North Korea.

The Russian government, he said, is studying ways to shield towns along the border from the effects of a nuclear battle. "We are obliged to consider preventive means to safeguard our interests, and — why hide this? — to protect our population," he said. "The government has given orders to this effect to the proper authorities."

Russia has tried to maintain friendly relations with North Korea, its ally during the cold war, even as it has sought to broaden ties with South Korea. In Seoul on Thursday, the Russian defense minister, Sergei B. Ivanov, said North Korea might well ignore United Nations condemnation of its nuclear program.

Today, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's nuclear-fuel company, Tenex, opened an office in Seoul. The company supplies nearly a third of the fuel needed for South Korean nuclear reactors.

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Washington Post
April 13, 2003
Pg. 25

Top Iraqi Scientist Surrenders To U.S.

A Valuable Source On Weapons Program

By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer

The top scientific adviser to Saddam Hussein turned himself over to U.S. forces in Baghdad yesterday, becoming the first associate of the deposed Iraqi president to surrender and providing the Bush administration with a potentially valuable source of information about the status of Iraq's proscribed weapons programs.

Lt. Gen. Amir Saadi, one of 55 people on the U.S. Central Command's list of most-wanted Iraqi government officials, arranged his surrender with the help of Germany's ZDF television network. It filmed him leaving his Baghdad villa with his German wife, Helga, and presenting himself to a U.S. Army warrant officer, who escorted him away.

Saadi, who worked in the Iraqi chemical weapons program in the 1980s and 1990s under Hussein's son-in-law and last year became the main liaison with U.N. weapons inspectors, told the German network that Iraq no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction -- a position he maintained before the war in his contacts with the U.N. inspections teams.

"He would know Iraq's chemical weapons program, since he lived with it," said Hans Blix, the chief U.N. inspector, in a telephone interview yesterday. As late as March 19, the day before the war against Iraq started, Blix said, he received a letter from Saadi saying Iraq had destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons.

"I was telling the truth, always telling the truth, never told anything but the truth, and time will bear me out, you will see," Saadi told ZDF. "There will be no difference after this war."

Three days after the Iraqi government collapsed and after more than three weeks of war, U.S. military and intelligence forces have yet to report any discoveries of banned weapons or weapons systems.

ZDF reported that Saadi also said he did not know where Hussein was, continuing the mystery of whether the former Iraqi leader is alive or dead. Also unknown is the whereabouts of more than four dozen other Iraqi officials on the U.S. list.

A chemist who was educated in Britain and Germany, Saadi was counselor to the presidency for scientific and technical affairs but was never considered part of Hussein's inner political and military circle.

Saadi, according to the German television network, has been in his Baghdad home since U.S. forces arrived in the capital and decided to turn himself in after learning he was on the United States' most-wanted list. In announcing the list Friday, Central Command said it was distributing decks of playing cards with the names and faces of the 55 Iraqi officials on them.

Saadi was on the seven-of-diamonds card.

His surrender in downtown Baghdad was arranged through his wife with the ZDF network in Baghdad. ZDF said one of its camera crews accompanied Saadi to the meeting with the Army officer and filmed his departure in a jeep. Blix said Saadi was "extremely knowledgeable and businesslike with no trace of propaganda in our discussions." In that sense, Blix added, he was different from Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, who always wanted to inject politics in discussions over weapons inspections.

However, Saadi's statements, that all of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons were destroyed in the summer of 1991 "had no credibility," Blix said. In the days before the war, Saadi argued in a letter to Blix that he could prove Iraq had destroyed unaccounted-for stockpiles of anthrax and VX nerve agents by analyzing the soil where, he said, they had been dumped.

Saadi also played a major role in the previous U.N. inspections in Iraq in the 1990s. In 1998, when then-chief inspector Richard Butler, head of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), reported that Iraq was interfering with his operations, Saadi led the Iraqi government's attack on the inspectors. He told reporters that Butler "is just exerting maximum pressure and provoking and beating the drums of war. He is just acting like a U.S. or a British politician."

Saadi said then that "the facts are Iraq declared these weapons. Iraq presented these weapons to UNSCOM, and Iraq destroyed them under the supervision of UNSCOM." One major problem in the inspections that resumed in November and ended shortly before the war, Blix said, is that in contrast to what Saadi said five years ago, Iraq

claimed it destroyed its biological and some of its chemical weapons "unilaterally" without UNSCOM being present and had no records to prove the destruction.

In January, when the United States was attempting to interview Iraqi scientists outside the country, Saadi told ABC News that he had been approached by U.S. and British agents during his trips abroad and asked to defect. He told reporters he never thought of defecting, and U.S. intelligence sources said he was not asked to do so.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, in his presentation of the U.S. case against Baghdad to the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5, said Saadi belonged to a high-level commission headed by Iraq's vice president, Taha Yassin Ramadan, and included Hussein's son Qusay. The commission reported directly to the Iraqi leader and managed the inspections that Powell said included movements of weapons to deceive the U.N. group.

"It was General Saadi who last fall publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors," Powell said. "Quite the contrary. Saadi's job is not to cooperate; it is to deceive; not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn nothing."

A day after Powell's speech, Saadi told reporters in Baghdad that the satellite pictures of alleged missile and chemical sites presented to the Security Council by Powell were "cartoons" and reports from defectors were "unreliable." He accused Washington of undermining the inspection program, saying, "What we heard today was for the general public and mainly the uninformed to influence their opinion and to initiate aggression on Iraq."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14821-2003Apr12.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

April 13, 2003

U.S. Soldiers Find Decontamination Bunker Complex

The vast network of underground rooms was designed to protect the Iraqi elite from chemical and biological weapons, Army says.

By David Zucchini, Times Staff Writer

BAGHDAD --U.S. troops have discovered a vast bunker complex equipped with pressurized offices and bedrooms, gas masks and chemical protective gear, and enough sophisticated chemical and biological decontamination equipment to protect hundreds -- perhaps thousands -- of senior Iraqi leaders and commanders.

The complex, discovered Friday by troops of the 3rd Infantry Division, was inspected Saturday by a military chemical team from division headquarters. The team said the complex, found beneath the sprawling grounds of the Presidential Palace, was designed to protect the Iraqi elite from toxic weapons.

"It's basically a command and control center designed to keep chemical or biological agents out," said Maj. Keith Reed, the division's deputy chemical officer. "This is a very, very interesting facility."

The complex, which stretches underground for several hundred feet in all directions, sits beneath a multistory, pale yellow stone building that looks similar to other grand structures on the two-mile-long palace grounds on the west bank of the Tigris River. Compartments within the bunkers are separated by 3-inch-thick steel doors that were left open when Iraqis fled, apparently in recent days or weeks.

It is believed to be the first discovery of an Iraqi bunker equipped with decontamination facilities.

"It's a very well-built, top-of-the-line system -- overpressurized, double-sealed, with full filtration," said Lt. Col. David Velazquez, the division's chemical officer. "I've seen other pressure systems, and this one is first-rate."

The chemical officers said the overpressurization would seal off the complex from contaminated outside air, while the ventilation system would ensure a supply of clean air.

Velazquez and Reed said they could not determine from a preliminary inspection whether the complex was intended to withstand a chemical or biological attack by Iran during Iraq's war with its neighbor in the 1980s; a feared attack by the U.S.-led forces; or a release of chemical or biological agents by Saddam Hussein's regime against U.S. troops or Iraqi civilians -- or all three.

A Los Angeles Times reporter who toured the darkened bunkers two hours before the chemical team arrived found a decontamination center just below the entrance to the complex, which is reached through a narrow stairway off the building's main lobby. A wide passageway leads to a small reception room posted with decontamination instructions in Arabic and an arrow pointing to "Decontamination Showers."

The center is equipped with showers sealed off on two sides by steel doors. On one side are syringes containing nerve gas antidotes, eyewash, kits with decontamination swabs and chemicals, and sealed bins for contaminated clothing.

Beyond the showers are lockers that apparently had contained fresh clothing. Through another steel door is a small medical facility, apparently designed for doctors to examine people emerging from the showers. Beyond the medical facility is a series of hallways leading to bunk rooms, apparently for soldiers or security officers.

Farther down are carpeted private bedroom suites with bathrooms featuring marble floors. Other hallways contain offices, meeting rooms and two large conference rooms equipped with microphones, video-conferencing equipment and maps with military grids.

The chemical team inspected the complex for nearly two hours, discovering an entrance to an upper central area of the building that was blocked by a sealed submarine-type air-lock door. A U.S. Special Forces team arrived to secure the building.

"There are at least one or two floors accessible only through that air lock," Reed told the Special Forces team. "Everything is designed to support something inside. There is definitely something of great interest in those mid-level areas."

The chemical officers said a military team would blow open the doors later to allow further inspections. The inspection was conducted with flashlights because the complex is without electricity or water. Although the entrance and lobby of the building above the complex was heavily damaged by U.S. attacks, the bunkers were untouched.

"You could stay in here and easily survive a chemical attack outside," Reed said, shining his flashlight on a room equipped with a bank of security cameras.

Inside the main control room, Maj. Mark Rasins, operations officer for the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division, whose Assassin Company discovered the complex, bent down in the dark and pulled out a ledger wedged beneath a cabinet. It contained detailed schematics of the complex, along with a guide to each section or compartment.

"Jackpot," Rasins said after an Arabic interpreter, Hakim Kawy Ashalan, read a summary on the ledger's cover. The ledger mentioned a subterranean area one level below the bunker complex that contains a "special room," No. 309.

The ledger was handed to Sgt. Spencer Willardson of the 141st Military Intelligence Battalion, who was searching the complex for Iraqi documents. Willardson then assisted Rasins, Ashalan and another interpreter, who gave his name as Abdul, as they shone their lights on a pegboard where scores of keys hung.

On their knees in the dark, the interpreters inspected the keys, each attached to a heavy metal tag stamped with room numbers. They did not find one for No. 309, but they found keys to a "translation room" that possibly contained translated documents, to an information desk, to "gas storage" and to "special latrine No. 1."

Rasins pried open a locked desk drawer, revealing a tangled pile of more marked keys. "Oh, my!" Abdul said, and began rifling through them.

Ashalan read a note on one paper key tag, apparently written by one officer to another: "In front of the glass door, there's another key hidden there."

Down a corridor, outside room No. 319, a warning light above a door is painted with a skull and crossbones and with "CO₂," carbon dioxide. On a steel door nearby is written, in Arabic, "Do NOT open this door until green light appears. Area could be contaminated."

Beside a steel door down another corridor, a pressure gauge had been installed with a green light to show when the pressure had been equalized on both sides of the door seal.

A blue steel door numbered 24 and sealed with a massive yellow padlock contained a warning: "It is absolutely prohibited to open this door." U.S. forces planned to force open the door later.

In the decontamination room, a series of Arabic signs provides detailed commands:

"Put your contaminated clothes inside this bag and then put it securely in the container provided."

"Put on new boots."

"Wash your hands in the liquid provided in the bowl."

"You must have a gas mask. Take it off here and deposit in container."

Stacked on shelves are military decontamination kits dated May 1988. They are similar to kits carried by U.S. troops during much of the Iraqi campaign. They contain syringes of atropine for nerve agents, blotting paper for cleaning exposed skin, cleansing powder and sterile eyewash.

The venting, electrical and security systems, along with the decontamination equipment, are stamped with the names of companies based in Germany, Serbia and Russia. Most of the equipment and internal systems are dated 1987, four years before U.N. sanctions were imposed in Iraq.

A surveillance camera is stamped "Helsinki." An electrical and air filtration panel is marked with the name of a firm called Energoinvest. Electric power equipment, dated 1987, is stamped with the name Flakt. "Piller" is stamped on valves and pipes, and the German company Drager manufactured the gas masks.

A U.S. company, Insta-Foam Products of Joliet, Ill., manufactured expanding polyurethane foam sealant in cans found inside the complex.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-war-bunker13apr13,1,5551372.story>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Washington Post

April 13, 2003

Pg. B3

Zeroing In

Chemical Weapons: A Hot Story's Elusive Proof

Wartime often generates stories that garner immediate attention, but then are pushed aside by other major developments. Zeroing In is focusing on some of the more startling claims and what has happened since they were first reported.

ORIGINAL REPORTS

On Monday, April 7, there were various news reports that U.S. troops looking for evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons were investigating materials at no fewer than four sites. A Reuters report that day -- about the discovery of suspicious substances at a military training camp -- quoted Maj. Michael Hamlet of the 101st Airborne Division as saying, "If tests from our experts confirm this, this could be the smoking gun."

THE DETAILS

The Pentagon says it has not completed tests yet on substances taken from three of the four sites, and has no idea of the source of the report about chemical weapon missiles.

The military training camp report: A Reuters report from Karbala said: "First tests on substances found at a military training camp in central Iraq suggest they contain a cocktail of banned chemical weapons, including deadly nerve agents, U.S. officers said on Monday." The report said U.S. forces found three 55-gallon barrels and eleven 25-gallon barrels and that "initial investigations . . . revealed levels of nerve agents sarin and tabun and the blister agent lewisite."

Follow-up: Gen. Benjamin Freakly of the 101st Airborne said the drums could contain "some type of pesticides." He noted that the site was along the Euphrates River and that his troops found pamphlets describing how to deal with mosquitoes. Tests are pending.

The missile cache mystery: On Monday, National Public Radio's John Burnett reported, "I just heard from a top military official here . . . who says that he received information today over the intelligence net . . . [of] the first solid confirmed existence of chemical weapons. He says a relatively large amount, perhaps 20 medium-range rockets, were found with warheads containing sarin, a nerve gas, and mustard gas." Burnett said the 101st Airborne found the missiles southwest of Baghdad.

Follow-up: The Pentagon denies any knowledge of this alleged discovery.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11145-2003Apr11.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Baltimore Sun

April 11, 2003

Pg. 1

Tests Point To Domestic Source Behind Anthrax Letter Attacks

Army reproductions hurt theories of foreign culprit

By Scott Shane, Sun Staff

Army scientists have reproduced the anthrax powder used in the 2001 mail attacks and concluded that it was made using simple methods, inexpensive equipment and limited expertise, according to government sources familiar with the work.

The findings reinforce the theory that has guided the FBI's 18-month-old investigation - that the mailed anthrax was probably produced by renegade scientists and not a military program such as Iraq's.

"It tends to support the idea that the anthrax came from a domestic source and probably not a state program," said David Siegrist, a bioterrorism expert at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. "It shows you can have a fairly sophisticated product with fairly rudimentary methods."

The new research, carried out at the Army's biodefense center at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, raises the disquieting possibility that al-Qaida and other terrorist groups could create lethal bioweapons without scientific or financial help from a state. The Bush administration had cited the possibility that Iraq might supply weapons to al-Qaida as a key reason for overthrowing Saddam Hussein.

"It would be better for our country if they'd concluded that [the mailed anthrax] had to have been made in a big facility with a lot of biowarfare experts," said David R. Franz, a former Army biodefense official and consultant on bioterrorism.

But Richard O. Spertzel, a biowarfare expert and former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, said he has heard that the Dugway research failed to match exactly the purity and small particle size of the mailed anthrax. Though he has no involvement in the case, he believes the FBI would be wrong to rule out Iraq or other states as the source of the deadly powder.

Van Harp, assistant FBI director in charge of the Washington Field Office, who oversees the anthrax investigation, declined to comment on what he called "uninformed speculation" about the anthrax research.

But Harp said 50 investigators are still working on what the bureau calls the Amerithrax case, backed by "a huge scientific effort."

"We're making progress," he said.

The anthrax-laced letters were mailed on Sept. 18 and Oct. 9, 2001, from a Princeton, N.J., mailbox and addressed to media organizations and two U.S. senators. The attack killed five people and sickened at least 17 others, and hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent to clean up government offices and postal facilities.

FBI and Postal Inspection Service agents initially considered a link to the Sept. 11 hijackers or Iraq. But after genetic analysis showed the anthrax was derived from the Ames strain used in the U.S. military biodefense program, investigators concentrated their effort on a domestic source.

Agents interviewed and conducted polygraph tests on scores of employees at the U.S. military biodefense research centers at Fort Detrick in Frederick and at Dugway Proving Ground.

Since last summer, they have focused much of their effort on Dr. Steven J. Hatfill, a former Fort Detrick bioweapons expert, repeatedly searching his Frederick apartment. In December and January, the FBI launched an extensive search in woods and ponds outside Frederick, an effort sources said was aimed at finding discarded biological equipment or other evidence.

Meanwhile, the FBI's Amerithrax task force ordered an exhaustive battery of scientific tests on the anthrax. Outside scientists say researchers probably have used chemical analysis to trace the water and nutrients used to grow the anthrax to a particular geographic area.

As part of the scientific sleuthing, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III announced in November that investigators were trying to "reverse engineer" the mailed anthrax.

Several sources discussed the work with The Sun on condition of anonymity. One investigator said that with about a dozen samples completed, scientists have matched the mailed powder closely enough to conclude it was made with "a pretty small operation" that cost "no more than a few thousand dollars."

The perpetrator would have needed expertise in microbiology to separate the dormant anthrax spores from the living vegetative cells, to dry the spores without killing them and to mill the product, the source said.

But the methods used point more to a makeshift lab than a professional operation, the source said. One clue pointing away from a state program was the absence of any additive to neutralize the spores' electrical charge and make them float more freely.

Such additives or coatings, including glass-like silica, were routinely used in past U.S., Soviet and Iraqi bioweapons programs, and some accounts have suggested that silica was present in the mailed anthrax. But more thorough testing disproved that.

"Everybody was looking for a coating, but there wasn't one," the investigator said.

The government is retaining detailed data on the various anthrax samples produced, creating a reference library to help track the source of powder used in any future anthrax attack.

Meanwhile, FBI agents still appear to be scrutinizing Hatfill, 49, a physician who became a lecturer and consultant on bioterrorism in the late 1990s. He has adamantly denied any connection to the anthrax letters and suggested the FBI has persecuted him because it can't find the real culprit.

Two weeks ago, two agents visited Insight magazine reporter Timothy W. Maier in Washington to ask him about an interview he conducted with Hatfill in 1998. They seemed particularly interested in a photograph printed in Insight that year of Hatfill posing in bioprotection gear, demonstrating "how a determined terrorist could cook up a batch of

plague in his or her own kitchen using common household ingredients and protective equipment from the supermarket," as the caption put it.

Maier said he was surprised it had taken so long after the FBI first started showing an interest in Hatfill before they looked into the article and photograph.

Critics of the FBI's efforts have pointed to other delays. In August, New Jersey Congressman Rush D. Holt blasted the bureau for taking nearly a year to test New Jersey mailboxes before finding the contaminated box in Princeton. But last week, after a new FBI briefing, Holt seemed far more impressed.

"Although I have been critical in the past of the conduct of the FBI's investigation, I am pleased to report today that the investigation seems to be making progress," Holt said. "The FBI has narrowed its search. That's about all I am permitted to say at this point."

<http://www.sunspot.net/bal-te.anthrax11apr11.story>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

April 13, 2003

The Poisons That Came From The West

By Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz

As allied troops interview Iraqi scientists, the chances grow of finding the chemical weaponry that Western governments believe Saddam Hussein was hiding since the gulf war of 1991. If the troops do find it, they will also find something else: that the means for making it came primarily from Western companies years ago.

At right is a graphic showing the origins of what Iraq said it imported for its chemical weapon effort. The data was given to United Nations inspectors in the late 1990's, and was reconfirmed in Iraq's 12,000-page declaration last fall. But the statistical material on which it is based remained confidential until recently.

The data reveals that firms in Germany and France outstripped all others in selling the most important thing — specialized chemical-industry equipment that is particularly useful for producing poison gas. Without this equipment, none of the other imports would have been of much use.

Iraq didn't declare everything it bought, so the data is incomplete. But they can be presumed to be reliable as far as they go. In general, the pattern of Iraqi behavior with United Nations inspectors was to admit buying something only after learning that the inspectors already knew about it. Thus, it seems logical to assume that the admitted imports actually occurred.

Iraq sometimes lied about the quantities of ingredients or munitions to protect suppliers or to conceal stocks remaining on hand. Equipment, on the other hand, was listed in discrete units, so those quantities seem to be reliable.

The countries of origin are compiled based on the exporter, not the manufacturer, because it was the exporter who decided to sell a sensitive item to Iraq. Most of the equipment described in the report is restricted for export today, even though it also has civilian uses, but it was probably not restricted when it was sold in the 1980's.

While individual items may have had innocuous uses, the usefulness of a combination of items on an order for making poison gas could have tipped off a seller. A former United Nations inspector, citing one case, said: "anyone looking at the order could see that all the chemicals were for sarin."

The absence of American firms from this picture does not mean that none supplied Mr. Hussein's mass-destruction weapons programs.

American firms show up on lists of suppliers of anthrax strains to Iraq, and of advanced electronics for nuclear and missile sites.

Gary Milhollin directs the Wisconsin Project, a research group in Washington that tracks mass destruction weapons. Kelly Motz is associate director, and Arthur Shulman, is a research associate, contributed to this project.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/weekinreview/13MILH.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

April 14, 2003

U.S. May Have To Allow Others To Inspect Iraqi Arms

By William J. Broad

The Bush administration may be legally bound to let independent inspectors confirm any findings of unconventional weapons in Iraq, administration and independent arms experts said. But they added that the White House, which has resisted help from the United Nations in the search for weapons, may decide to ignore such legalities.

The administration is debating its obligations under arms control treaties that govern chemical, biological and nuclear arms, an official involved in the discussions said in an interview.

"If we gain control, then theoretically they're ours," the official said of Iraqi unconventional arms. "Someone could argue that because we now own them, we have to meet all the requirements" of the weapon treaties, which predate recent United Nations inspections of Iraq.

The official added that the Pentagon, which has responsibility for any discovered Iraqi arms, wants no outside help. "But people are thinking about that," he added. "Although the current guidance is not to plan to operate with an international organization, that doesn't mean that won't change."

Last week, when asked about possible doubts about chemical finds, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said measures had been put in place to diminish the chance that someone might tamper with battlefield evidence or exploit a murky situation to charge fraud, incompetence or self-deception. "We've got people who have been alerted to the importance of chain of custody," Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters.

A White House official said the White House would have no public comment on the debate over independent inspectors.

Outside the government, weapon experts have argued for the United States to let international inspectors help identify and destroy any discovered unconventional weapons in Iraq. They say that independent confirmation would help convince skeptics that the war was just.

Washington cited the need to disarm Iraq as the main reason for the invasion. Yet, so far, no unambiguous evidence has come to light demonstrating that Iraq possessed such prohibited weapons.

"Bush's credibility is hanging in the balance," said Dr. Elisa D. Harris, a Clinton administration arms control official now at the University of Maryland.

For weeks, advancing troops have reported signs of chemical arms: gas masks, protective suits, nerve gas antidotes, training manuals, barrels of suspicious chemicals and a cache of mysterious shells. While the military has undertaken many tests and inspections, none of the chemicals have been proven to be warfare agents, rather than pesticides or other legitimate chemicals they can closely resemble.

Administration and private experts said one treaty that may require letting independent weapon inspectors into Iraq is the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which 150 nations, including the United States, have signed.

The treaty bars the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical arms. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, based in The Hague and known as the O.P.C.W., polices the treaty around the globe and in the United States, which is slowly destroying its old stockpiles of chemical arms.

Though Iraq did not sign the treaty, several leading experts said the United States, by taking possession of Iraqi chemical arms, would fall under its provisions even though the treaty makes no explicit reference to the responsibilities of a victor in war.

"The spirit of the treaty is that the destruction of chemical weapons globally is up to the O.P.C.W. to verify," said Barry Kellman, director of the International Weapons Control Center at DePaul University in Chicago and co-author of a book on how states can meet treaty duties. "If we find chemical weapons, the O.P.C.W. should supervise their destruction."

Mary E. Hoinkes, general counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Clinton administration, said the crucial issue was who determines the fate of captured chemical weapons. "If we're talking about destroying them after hostilities are over, collecting them and destroying them, that's when the obligations kick in," she said.

Experts said the reverse might also be argued. Under international law, some noted, obligations usually run to states rather than particular governments or controlling forces. The nuclear issue is clearer, legal experts agreed. That is because Iraq signed the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, which aims to bar the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty's enforcement arm, the International Atomic Energy Agency, based in Vienna and known as the I.A.E.A., has teams of inspectors that regularly checked Iraq's nuclear facilities before the war.

Thomas Graham Jr., general counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter, Reagan and first Bush administrations, said there was no question that the United States had to let in I.A.E.A. inspectors. "If we didn't," he said, "we'd be accessory to a violation."

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the I.A.E.A., has publicly called for the Bush administration to let his inspectors into Iraq when the fighting stops. Late last week, an agency spokesman in Vienna said it had so far received no reply.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/14/international/worldspecial/14VERI.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

April 14, 2003

U.S. Search For Illegal Arms Narrowed To About 36 Sites

By Don Van Natta Jr. and David Johnston

WASHINGTON, April 12 — American forces have narrowed their hunt for banned weapons in Iraq to about three dozen sites, hoping to accelerate their search, government officials say. So far, no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons have been found.

The priority sites, whose number had not previously been disclosed, are dispersed throughout Iraq. They were selected from more than 1,000 laboratories, plants, military installations and storage facilities once thought to contain banned weapons and component materials, the officials said.

The narrowed list is intended to increase the odds of military search teams quickly uncovering weapons materials, but the inspection of the sites is expected to take at least a month, the officials said. They would not discuss the sites, saying the information was classified.

The search for weapons is the most visible investigative effort now under way in Iraq, but it is only a part of a much broader inquiry, led by the Defense Intelligence Agency, to catalog more than three decades of crimes by Saddam Hussein's government.

The hunt for the weapons is being conducted by the Army's 75th Intelligence Exploitation Task Force, which includes numerous teams of several hundred Defense Intelligence Agency officers, Central Intelligence Agency officers, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and biologists.

Nearly a dozen of the priority sites have already been inspected, officials said. But so far inspectors have found no evidence of the weapons whose elimination was often cited by President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain as a principal justification for the war with Iraq.

Several times in the last three weeks American marines have come upon sites where they suspected banned weapons might have been developed, only to learn later that they were benign.

On Saturday, Gen. Amir al-Saadi, Mr. Hussein's top scientific adviser and the liaison with United Nations weapons inspectors, turned himself in to the American military in Baghdad, and may prove a valuable source of information. In the past week, American troops have retrieved file cabinets of laboratory manuals and technical papers at some of the sites where they have searched for banned weapons and component materials. Officials said that they hoped the documents, which must be translated and evaluated, would provide an important guide to Iraq's weapons programs. The wider investigation is intended to assemble evidence about banned weapons programs. Inspectors are also looking for information about possible crimes committed by Mr. Hussein and his leadership circle against ethnic minorities and other Iraqi citizens and whether foreign companies violated United Nations sanctions barring trade with Iraq, the officials said.

American forces are collecting documents, computers and computer disks, which Pentagon officials are copying and transferring out of Iraq for translation and preservation. The documents include personnel data, prison records, military files, shipping inventories and technical data from research labs.

This DocEx project, as it is known at the Pentagon for "document exploitation," is expected to take years to complete. Widespread looting of government offices in Baghdad and elsewhere has complicated the task, raising fears among American officials that evidence about banned weapons and government crimes may have disappeared. On Friday, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said the effort to uncover wrongdoing by the Iraqi government and evidence of prohibited weapons could take weeks or longer.

"We are looking for people," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "We continue to look for people who can help us find the people we want to find, and people who can help us find the weapon sites of interest and people who can help us find records, for example, of Baath Party members and the like. But I don't have anything of note to report."

Senior Bush administration officials said they remained convinced that banned weapons would be found. "We have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction," said the White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer. "This is what this war was about and is about. And we have high confidence it will be found."

American military intelligence officials have also sought evidence that the Qaeda terror network had a presence in Iraq and ties to Mr. Hussein's government. Here, too, they have come up empty.

In his presentation before the United Nations in February, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell described Ansar al-Islam, an Islamic militant group based in northern Iraq, as having links to Baghdad and Al Qaeda. Ansar was defeated as a military force in a three-day battle last month with American Special Forces soldiers and Kurdish fighters.

A large amount of raw intelligence was obtained from Ansar's bunkers and officers, including laptop computers and reams of documents. Intelligence officials also found addresses and phone numbers for Ansar's contacts in the Muslim world.

Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that a site Mr. Powell had described as a Qaeda terrorist camp in northern Iraq had been used to manufacture ricin, a poison made from castor beans. General Myers said he believed that the ricin discovered in a north London apartment last January had come from that camp.

However, United States officials said they had still not found any evidence linking Al Qaeda's presence in northern Iraq with the toppled Baghdad government.

Mr. Powell also said that the Iraqi government was harboring "a deadly terrorist network" of 20 Qaeda members, led by Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, an associate of Osama bin Laden.

Officials said they had not located Mr. Zarqawi or found any evidence of a Qaeda cell operating in Baghdad.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/14/international/worldspecial/14HUNT.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

US hunts for Dr Germ and Mrs Anthrax

CHIDANAND RAJGHATA

TIMES NEWS NETWORK [SUNDAY, APRIL 13, 2003 07:03:00 PM]

WASHINGTON: Saddam Hussain and secular Iraq may take pride in being home to the most emancipated women in the Arab world, but the United States is not impressed. Amid universal opprobrium over lack of evidence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, Washington is looking for two Iraqi women scientists believed to be central to Baghdad's bio-warfare programme.

They go by the fearful monikers of Mrs Anthrax and Dr Germ.

Mrs Anthrax, also known as "Chemical Sally" in western circles, is Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, the lone woman seen in several video clips of Saddam Hussain meeting with his Revolutionary Command Council. Sitting demurely next to the Iraqi dictator's feared son Qusay in a room full of men, Dr Ammash is now believed to be on the lam, having possibly escaped to Syria.

The United States has counted her among the 55 most wanted Iraqis, and she features as a "five of hearts" in the deck of cards Washington has issued in its hunt.

According to western intelligence sources, Dr Ammash, who earned a PhD in microbiology at the University of Missouri in the mid-1980s after a master's degree from George Bush's home state Texas, helped rebuild Iraq's bioweapons programme in the 1990. Her doctorate focused on the poisoning effects of radiation, paraquat and adrimycin, a chemotherapy drug, on bacteria and mammals.

At the height of the US bombing of Baghdad, video clips released by the Iraqi government often showed the camera panning past Ammash, usually dressed in military uniform and covered with a headscarf. The clips alarmed Washington, which believed that it was a message from Baghdad that Iraq was ready to use bio-weapons on Coalition forces.

A more mundane explanation, now that the American panic has proved to unfounded, is that she is the lone woman in the Iraqi high command, which contrary to US propaganda, was a diverse group with Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, Christians and other minorities.

According to Iraqi exiles in the US, Ammash was appointed to the 18-member Revolutionary Command Council in 2001 even though her own father Salih Mahdi Ammash is believed to have been killed by the Saddam Hussain regime because he was emerging as an alternative power center in the Baath Party.

Also wanted by Washington but not figuring in the deck of cards is Mrs. Rihab Taha, who is nicknamed Dr Germ in US circles because she is said to have kick-started Iraq's bio-weapons programme from the town of Hakam in the early 1980s. She is married to Iraq's oil minister, Lt. Gen. Amir Rashid Mohammed Ubaydi, who figures in the Washington wanted deck of cards.

Dr Taha interviewed with UN weapons inspectors several times in the 1990s and defended Iraq's programme, and according to one account angrily threw furniture during a testimony.

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/articleshow?msid=43280483>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

April 13, 2003

Hussein's Top Science Adviser Surrenders to U.S. Marines

By CRAIG S. SMITH

BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 12 — Gen. Amir al-Saadi, Saddam Hussein's top science adviser, turned himself in to United States marines in downtown Baghdad today after telling a German journalist that Iraq had no chemical or biological weapons.

"Nothing, nothing," General Saadi said during a taped interview in his Baghdad home before surrendering to the marines. "I'm saying this for posterity, for history, not for defending the regime."

General Saadi, 64, the architect of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and the liaison with United Nations arms inspectors searching for banned weapons, had been spending the war in the basement of his villa in a wealthy Baghdad neighborhood, following events with a generator-powered television and satellite dish as the bombs exploded around him.

His wife, who is German and teaches at Baghdad University, contacted Ulrich Tilgner, Baghdad correspondent for the German television network ZDF, to interview her husband before he gave himself up.

When Mr. Tilgner arrived at General Saadi's villa for the interview this morning, the scientist told him he had decided to surrender after seeing his picture that morning on a BBC broadcast that listed him as 34th on a list of 55 Iraqi government officials wanted for prosecution as war criminals. But he said that, to the best of his knowledge, Iraq had discontinued its chemical and biological weapons programs and destroyed all stocks of the agents.

"Time will bear me out," he said. "There will be no difference after the war is over."

He said Iraq's last report to Hans Blix, a chief weapons inspector for the United Nations, accounted for 550 missing artillery shells filled with mustard gas and that the country was close to accounting for all missing weapons of mass destruction, including VX, a nerve gas, when the war began.

"I was knowledgeable about those programs, those past programs, and I was telling the truth, always the truth," he said. "We were finally approaching the point of getting everything accounted for, but things have turned out differently."

He then asked Mr. Tilgner to arrange his surrender. Mr. Tilgner returned to the Palestine Hotel, where most of the foreign journalists covering Baghdad are based, and told his story to two somewhat incredulous marines in the lobby. They checked with their senior officer and agreed to meet General Saadi at a checkpoint about a 45-minute drive away.

Mr. Tilgner returned to General Saadi's villa and picked up the Iraqi scientist and his wife.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/international/worldspecial/13SCIE.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

April 14, 2003

Pg. 1

Nuclear Scientist Surrenders

He is the second expert to give up, making the U.S. hopeful it can crack weapons programs.

By Bob Drogin, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON --Saddam Hussein's leading nuclear weapons scientist has surrendered outside Iraq, U.S. officials said Sunday, a day after his top scientific advisor gave himself up in Baghdad.

The surrenders of Jafar Jafar, who founded and led Iraq's clandestine efforts to build a nuclear bomb, and Gen. Amir Saadi, a key figure in the development of chemical arms, means that U.S. interrogators now have access to the two most senior figures in Iraq's programs to create weapons of mass destruction in the 1980s and '90s.

"These are very, very significant," said a U.S. official. "They will have extremely valuable insights into where the bad stuff is, how they got it and where the other people are. The potential is there that these two guys can crack Saddam's weapons programs for us."

Before the war began, both scientists took part in high-level meetings in Baghdad with Hans Blix, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, and Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency. The Iraqis insisted at the time that Hussein's government had long ago turned over or destroyed its illegal weapons, but Bush administration officials did not believe them.

U.S. officials hope that the scientists will reveal secrets of any Iraqi nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programs. President Bush has repeatedly cited the presence of illegal weapons in Iraq as justification for the war, but no such weapons have been used or found so far.

If the scientists do not provide the information, special Pentagon weapons "exploitation" teams will be forced to search as many as 3,000 sites they have identified in hopes of finding suspected weapons caches and the people and programs that produced them.

"I have absolute confidence that there are weapons of mass destruction inside this country," Army Gen. Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, told Fox News on Sunday.

"Whether we will turn out at the end of the day to find them in one of the 2- or 3,000 sites we already know about, or whether ... one of these officials ... will tell us [about the site] ... I'm not sure," Franks added.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said interrogation of weapons scientists will be the only way to find Iraq's alleged weapons.

"We're not going to find anything until we find people who tell us where the things are," he said on NBC's "Meet the Press." "And we have that very high on our priority list, to find the people who know."

Officials said the Bush administration may offer amnesty or other deals to Jafar and Saadi with the hope that they will not only cooperate but help arrange the surrenders of other Iraqi weapons scientists, engineers and technicians.

"We did it with Wernher von Braun," a U.S. official said, referring to the German rocket engineer who helped pioneer the U.S. space program after he led 126 colleagues to the U.S. in "Operation Paperclip" in 1945. "These guys can get others to come in."

Jafar is not in American custody, but U.S. intelligence officials met with him shortly after he turned himself in late last week to a Middle Eastern government that officials refused to identify.

"U.S. officials have had access to him and will continue to do so," the American official said.

Jafar is not in Syria, the official added. The White House and the Pentagon have repeatedly warned Syrian President Bashar Assad's government not to harbor Iraqi leaders, citing reports that members of Hussein's regime, as well as key Iraqi bioweapons experts and other scientists, have slipped into Syria.

Neither Hussein nor most of his top political and military commanders are known to have been killed or taken prisoner in the war. But one of the deposed dictator's half brothers, Watban Ibrahim Hasan, was captured by Iraqi tribesmen in northern Iraq and turned over to American forces, U.S. officials said Sunday. There were unconfirmed reports that he had been trying to cross into Syria.

Hasan is the five of spades in a deck of playing cards depicting the Pentagon's most-wanted list of 52 Iraqi officials. But U.S. intelligence officials downplayed his importance Sunday, saying he was fired as Iraq's interior minister in 1995 and was no longer considered a member of Hussein's inner circle.

Jafar, however, was "always seen as the most important nuclear scientist" in Iraq and "probably the best scientist Iraq has ever produced," said former nuclear weapons inspector David Albright, who met with Jafar in the mid-1990s when Albright worked in Iraq for the IAEA.

"He's the guy who created the vast underground nuclear infrastructure," Albright said. "He's their top nuclear person and always has been."

Albright described Jafar, a British- and Swiss-trained scientist, as "very smooth, very polished and very proud of his accomplishments." He said Jafar even sought to gain nuclear secrets from the U.N. inspectors who interviewed him. "He would probe us," Albright said. "He would ask for classified information."

Jafar told U.N. inspectors that he was jailed and tortured by Hussein's government in the early 1980s. Upon his release, he said, he agreed to launch what soon became a multibillion-dollar program, known by the code word PC-3, to develop and build nuclear weapons.

He nearly succeeded. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, IAEA inspectors and U.S. officials determined that Jafar's team had worked out the engineering, electronics, diagnostics, metallurgy and high explosives needed to build a crude nuclear device.

Moreover, they concluded, after trying five methods to produce fissile material as fuel for a bomb, the Iraqi regime was only about a year away from producing enough enriched uranium in gas centrifuges for a workable bomb.

Western intelligence agencies tried to convince Jafar to defect or become an informant when he visited U.N. headquarters in New York or IAEA headquarters in Vienna in the late 1980s.

Jafar dropped out of sight after the 1991 war, former U.N. inspectors recall, but he reemerged in 1996 and became a key source for IAEA inspectors seeking to disarm Iraq under U.N. resolutions. They destroyed or dismantled Iraq's entire nuclear weapons program by 1998, according to U.N. reports.

The White House repeatedly charged last fall that Hussein secretly reconstituted his nuclear weapons program after 1998. As evidence, they cited Iraq's alleged covert efforts to procure high-strength aluminum tubes for gas centrifuges, as well as an alleged attempt to import 500 tons of uranium from the African country of Niger.

But IAEA teams that returned to Iraq last year challenged or refuted much of the evidence that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell presented to the U.N. Security Council in February. The IAEA said Iraq needed aluminum tubes for artillery rockets, and it said the documents from Niger were forged.

U.S. intelligence and military officials have been surprised and pleased that Iraqi forces did not launch any chemical or biological weapons against U.S. troops or Iraqi civilians during the war in Iraq.

But they are frustrated that no proof has yet been found to support Bush administration claims that Hussein had prepared vast stockpiles of nerve gases and blister agents, lethal viruses and other germ agents.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/iraq/inside/la-war-scientists14apr14,1,2788539.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Diraq>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

New York Times

April 14, 2003

Israelis Get The All Clear To Stow Their Gas Masks

By Greg Myre

JERUSALEM, April 13 — Israel's defense minister said today that the danger of an Iraqi missile attack had passed and citizens could put away their gas masks. Meanwhile, Israeli commentators questioned whether other regional dangers might also soon diminish.

"The missile threat from western Iraq no longer exists, as far as we can tell," Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said. Few Israelis needed the official word. Most had already stopped carrying their army-issued gas masks and had dismantled sealed rooms, part of nationwide preparations to guard against a nonconventional Iraqi attack. During the Persian Gulf war in 1991, Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles with conventional warheads at Israel, causing extensive damage but few casualties.

United States troops have scoured Iraq's western desert, the only place from which the Iraqi missiles could reach Israel, and there have been no reports that missiles or launchers were found. Still, Israel was keeping its Arrow antimissile batteries on alert, the Defense Ministry said.

The Israeli news media, meanwhile, have been filled with debate on whether Saddam Hussein's swift fall in Iraq would chasten Israel's other rivals in the region, particularly Syria and the militant Shiite Muslim group it supports in Lebanon, Hezbollah.

Optimistic Israeli analysts envision the American-led military operation in Iraq paving the way for a new, more moderate Middle East that would give Israel the possibility of broadening its very limited contacts in the Arab world.

"A window of opportunity for Israel has opened up in Baghdad, a kind of crack in the sky, something that happens in our region perhaps once every 50 years," wrote Guy Bechor in Yediot Ahronot, a leading Israeli daily. "The window could soon closed. It would be a shame not to take advantage of it."

Israel's infrastructure minister, Yosef Paritzsky, even raised the prospect of reopening a regional oil pipeline that went dry when Iraq and other Arab states began boycotting Israel at its independence in 1948. The long abandoned pipeline runs from Iraq's northern oil fields, across Jordan and to the northern Israeli port city of Haifa.

But others were far more cautious, saying Israel would face the same friction points and should not expect any dramatic breakthroughs.

"One has to be realistic," said Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University. "I don't think there will be many political and diplomatic opportunities for Israel. And a triumphal Israeli attitude will be counterproductive."

The Israelis will be looking closely for any signs of change in Syria and Lebanon. The Bush administration has been sharply critical of Syria and its young leader, Bashar al-Assad, accusing him of aiding Iraq.

If President Assad seeks to avoid further confrontation with the United States, he may act to restrain Hezbollah, which periodically trades fire with Israeli forces across the Israeli-Lebanese frontier. Hezbollah, which is also backed by Iran, is on Washington's list of terrorist groups.

"If the United States is telling Syria to keep things quiet, I imagine the message Syria will give to Hezbollah is, 'Be careful,'" Mr. Avineri said.

Syria has had troops in Lebanon for more than a quarter century, is regarded as the main power broker there and has considerable influence over Hezbollah.

In 2000, Israel pulled its troops out of south Lebanon, ending an 18-year occupation. The move greatly reduced the intensity of the conflict, but the shooting has not ended.

Today, Hezbollah fighters fired antiaircraft rounds at Israeli warplanes flying over south Lebanon. Earlier this month, three Hezbollah antiaircraft shells, fired at Israeli planes, landed in northern Israel, but caused no injuries.

Haim Barbivai, the mayor of Kiryat Shmona, the northern Israeli town often targeted by Hezbollah, called on the Israeli Air Force not to fly over southern Lebanon during the Jewish holiday of Passover, which begins this week.

The planes and the resulting Hezbollah fire scare away tourists, he told Israel radio.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/14/international/worldspecial/14ISRA.html>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

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Pg. 1

With Bioterror Fears Rising, An Expert Winds Up On Trial

When Dr. Butler Said He Lost 30 Samples Of the Plague, It Triggered a Federal Case

By Russell Gold, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

Dr. Thomas Butler has devoted much of his 30-year career to research on the plague, a fast-spreading infectious disease that kills its victims within days.

He earned a tenured position in infectious diseases at Texas Tech University and published dozens of papers in prestigious journals. As the threat of terrorism escalated in recent years, the Army and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control expressed interest in collaborating with him on studies of how best to treat outbreaks of the plague.

Then, on Jan. 11, he arrived at his office and made an entry in his research log that would change his life and stun his colleagues. He wrote that 30 vials of plague bacteria were missing and possibly stolen from his laboratory. Campus police notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The news traveled quickly to Washington, where Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge personally ordered his staff to put crisis plans into action. By 3 a.m. on Jan. 15, 60 FBI and local law-enforcement agents were searching Dr. Butler's home and knocking on doors across Lubbock.

If a terrorist released samples of the plague bacteria -- known as yersinia pestis, or YP -- over a city using an aerosol bomb, thousands of people could arrive at emergency rooms with what appeared to be rapidly progressing pneumonia. Without proper treatment, patients would almost certainly die from respiratory failure.

Investigators descending on Lubbock discovered that Dr. Butler had traveled to Tanzania, a suspected haven for terrorists and site of a 1998 U.S. embassy bombing. Their suspicions only grew when federal officials learned the scientist had carried vials of YP on commercial flights from Tanzania to Texas without proper import licenses. That afternoon, the 61-year-old Dr. Butler was led into court in leg irons and handcuffs. The missing vials were the top story on national cable news channels for hours on the morning of his arrest.

Before Sept. 11, 2001, the case probably wouldn't have aroused the attention of anyone beyond his immediate supervisors. Now, however, Dr. Butler faces 14 felony charges and, if convicted, up to 74 years in jail. Last week a grand jury handed up an indictment charging him with lying to federal agents and illegally transporting undeclared vials of YP on commercial airplanes and in Federal Express packages. No trial date has been set. Dr. Butler's lawyer says he will plead not guilty.

The FBI has concluded that Dr. Butler had no connection to terrorist activities. But why he would destroy the vials and lie about it, as the investigators allege, remains a mystery. Assistant U.S. Attorney Dick Baker describes Dr. Butler as a potential threat to the "safety of the community." Dr. Butler didn't respond to requests for interviews. Until recently, Dr. Butler appeared to be on the forefront of the fight against terrorism. Now, he is under house arrest, wearing an electronic monitoring bracelet. His research has been halted. He is barred from any contact with colleagues at the Centers for Disease Control or the U.S. Army's Institute of Infectious Diseases.

Dr. Butler's case is an example of the difficulties involved in assessing potential threats in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. In a world where the public and law-enforcement officials alike are inclined to endorse hair-trigger responses, some people may be caught in the crossfire.

Aversion to Paperwork

Colleagues believe Dr. Butler is a diligent researcher with a blase attitude about paperwork. Federal officials, however, see him as a serious threat. Dr. Butler declined to comment for this article. His lawyer says he is a victim of the nation's "state of war" on terrorism. For now, it's impossible to know. Still, extensive interviews with others involved in this case and a review through open-records filings of hundreds of pages of documents show Dr. Butler's rapid transformation from respected researcher to accused felon.

Dr. Butler looks like Hollywood's image of a trustworthy physician: tall, thin and white-haired, with a gentle smile. When he wasn't teaching or treating patients, he worked in a windowless office on the fourth floor of the Health Sciences building at Texas Tech. The only personal touch in his lab was a coffee maker, colleagues said. Everything else was books and beakers.

He was a naval officer stationed in Vietnam in 1969, when he first witnessed the stunning brutality of the plague. "We were humbled by the swift progression of this disease which carried healthy individuals to death within three days," he wrote. He encountered the bubonic variety of the plague, which is spread by infected fleas and launched the pandemic responsible for wiping out a third of Europe's population in the 14th century. Officials worry that terrorists may deploy a different form of the same disease: the pneumonic plague, which can be spread by a human coughing -- or a terrorist's aerosol bomb.

Since 1999 his research focused on a seemingly simple question. Which antibiotic is better to treat the disease: streptomycin or gentamicin?

The Food and Drug Administration prefers streptomycin. But the drug isn't manufactured regularly anymore in part because it can cause hearing loss. Not being able to get enough antibiotics quickly would be catastrophic in the event of an outbreak. "Pneumonic plague is invariably fatal if antibiotic therapy is delayed more than one day," says the U.S. Army's handbook on responding to bioterrorism.

That's why the Army prefers the widely available gentamicin, even though it has never been approved by the FDA for use treating the pneumonic plague. Even before the Sept. 11 terrorist assaults, and the anthrax attacks that followed, interest in Dr. Butler's work was growing.

"I am very much interested in doing some collaborative plague work and would relish participating in some field trials," Col. Ted Cieslak of the Army's Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., wrote to Dr. Butler in a 1999 letter obtained in an open-records request to Texas Tech.

Focus on Plague

In 2001, Texas Tech granted Dr. Butler a one-year sabbatical so he could focus exclusively on plague research. Three times over the next 12 months he traveled to Tanzania. There, he worked with William Mwengee, a medical officer for the Ministry of Health stationed in the rural northeast corner of the country, where the plague is endemic. With approval from the Tanzanian government, Dr. Mwengee began to recruit patients for his study.

At the same time, back in Lubbock, an academic spat with significant consequences was brewing. In 1999, Dr. Butler had received the first of two grants for a total of \$179,000 from Chiron Corp., a biotech company in Emeryville, Calif., to enroll patients in a large study to determine whether an experimental drug improved their chances of surviving severe sepsis, an often-fatal blood infection.

Most patients with severe sepsis die quickly. The mortality rate can be as high as 50%. The number of patients dying in Dr. Butler's study attracted the attention of the university's Institutional Review Board, which oversees human research to protect patients. When the IRB asked questions, Dr. Butler was slow to provide requested documents, according to Lorenz Lutherer, a physiology professor who mediated a dispute between Dr. Butler and university administrators over how the incident was handled in its early stages. Texas Tech shut down the trial in May 2001, and then restarted it a month later when he provided documents showing that other hospitals involved in the drug trial had similar mortality rates.

"It was a paperwork issue," says Dr. Lutherer. The situation left Dr. Butler feeling as if his credibility had been unjustly attacked, according to Dr. Lutherer. While the academic spat was resolved, the IRB's investigation slowly proceeded.

As the dispute heated up, Dr. Butler was getting more deeply involved in his Tanzania project. In April 2002, on his final trip to Africa, he brought back YP samples in vials. The containers were stowed in his luggage aboard the commercial flights. According to the indictment, he failed to declare his cargo on customs forms, as the CDC required.

The next month, the FDA announced that it would award three grants with a combined value of \$2.1 million to develop clinical studies of gentamicin, the Army's preferred plague fighter. In his Lubbock laboratory, Dr. Butler was already growing cultures of the YP strain he brought back from Tanzania. He began testing various antibiotics on the cultures. He appeared to be a leading candidate to receive one of the FDA grants.

In June 2002, he led a two-day seminar at the CDC's infectious-disease laboratory in Fort Collins, Colo., driving there from Texas with the plague samples in his car. Although preliminary, the results of his clinical trials on patients in Tanzania suggested that gentamicin was the better drug. The data were "quite promising," says David Dennis, a retired epidemiologist who oversaw the plague program for the CDC.

Seeking a Grant

Upon returning from Colorado, Dr. Butler went to work applying for one of the FDA's \$700,000 grants. He submitted a 24-page proposal. For his work in Tanzania, he proposed to purchase a freezer, a centrifuge, \$16,000 of antibiotics and a \$30,000 four-wheel-drive vehicle. He detailed his contacts with Dr. Mwengee and explained that the Tanzanian government had given permission to test gentamicin on plague patients. For his Lubbock lab, he sought a \$20,000 autoclave, which is used to sterilize lab equipment, and funding to pay a full-time research assistant an annual salary of \$26,500.

Dr. Mwengee couldn't be reached to comment.

Dr. Butler failed, however, to file a two-page application known as Form 1571. Gentamicin isn't approved for plague patients, so the form was required before the drug could be tested on humans. In the application, Dr. Butler said he intended to test first, then file the form "if the clinical performance of gentamicin is good." Such "off label" use of prescription drugs by doctors is common, but clinical researchers are required to adhere to rigorous procedures to make sure patients in a drug trial are informed of the potential risks.

In August, the FDA says it rejected his application because he failed to file Form 1571. A university aide who helped Dr. Butler put together the application reminded him of the requirement to fill out the form three times, according to a university official. To date, only one of the three FDA grants has been awarded.

In September, Mike Jones, a Texas Tech biosafety officer, received a fax from the Army scientists at Fort Detrick requesting some of Dr. Butler's plague samples for study. When the biosafety officer asked Dr. Butler if he had plague samples in his laboratory, Dr. Butler said he didn't, according to an affidavit taken by university police. The federal indictment alleges that a couple of days earlier, Dr. Butler had packed YP samples into a Federal Express package and sent them to Tanzania.

Shut Down

About a month later, Dr. Butler learned that the university's Internal Review Board was shutting down all his human research. The IRB said the decision was based on a review of the work he did on the Chiron sepsis drug. The specific reason was blacked out on a document acquired through an open-records request.

A week after his suspension, university officials learned that Dr. Butler not only had YP samples in his lab but had given some of them to Army researchers at Fort Detrick. According to the indictment, Dr. Butler carried them on an American Airlines flight from Lubbock to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Once again, he hadn't done the proper paperwork, according to the indictment.

On Jan. 10, Dr. Butler was hand-delivered a letter telling him the university was proceeding with an inquiry into his activities. The letter was obtained in a Freedom of Information Act request, but most of its contents were blacked out. It is unclear whether the focus of the investigation was the Chiron drug trial, Dr. Butler's plague research, both, or something else entirely. University officials confirmed they are investigating but declined to provide details. The next day, a Saturday, Dr. Butler went to his lab to work on the plague samples. He wrote in his laboratory log that 30 vials of YP were missing.

On Tuesday afternoon, Dr. Butler met with the chairman of his department, Dr. Donald Wesson, and repeated that the vials were missing.

"I was flabbergasted," Dr. Wesson stated in an affidavit. Reached at his home Sunday, Dr. Wesson said, "I don't know why he did what he did," but declined to comment further.

Dr. Butler told his superiors he didn't see any reason to notify campus police. He suggested a departmental investigation. But the dean of the medical school disagreed and called the police.

A little more than a year earlier, Lubbock had been the site of a mock bioterrorism drill staged by the Justice Department. The scenario was eerily prescient: Terrorists use an aerosol bomb to spread YP at a concert in the Buddy Holly Civic Center.

Chain Reaction

When Dr. Butler reported the vials missing, campus police applied the lessons learned during the drill. That set off a chain reaction that tested many of the new systems established in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. Lubbock and Washington swung into action.

Dr. Butler's attorney, Floyd Holder, says local and federal officials overreacted. "Academic freedom," says Mr. Holder, "is inconsistent with us being in a state of war."

He says his client accidentally sterilized the tubes in an autoclave, then forgot he had done so. He notes that Dr. Butler had nearly 200 vials with YP in his laboratory and that losing track of 30 of them is not as difficult as it might sound.

In simpler times, a report of missing vials probably would have drawn little attention. Even Dr. Butler's decision to carry vials of the plague in his suitcase would have aroused scant concern. The practice is so common that CDC officials have a nickname for it: "VIP," for "vial in pocket."

But terrorist threats have changed that. After five people died from exposure to anthrax, Congress passed laws to expand federal oversight of laboratories working with dangerous toxins. The federal government wants to maintain an up-to-date national inventory of the toxins. Some of Dr. Butler's colleagues say his arrest could have a chilling effect on their work.

"The image of a professor in shackles was very upsetting to many of us," says Anthony Way, a preventive-medicine professor at Texas Tech. "Nobody, particularly a professor, deserves that treatment."

The CDC estimates that about 800 labs nationwide work with so-called select agents, the 49 toxins on the government's bioterrorism list. Federal officials acknowledge that policing these labs won't be easy. Starting this spring, labs must submit a list of all the select agents they contain and notify the federal government when any of them are destroyed. In addition, the Justice Department will run background checks on scientists working with toxins. Failure to comply is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison. The new laws also say that anyone convicted of a felony can no longer work with the 49 select agents. That means that if Dr. Butler is convicted, his career would effectively be finished.
-- Gary Fields contributed to this article.

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)

U.S. Army Finds Mobile Labs Buried Near Karbala, Iraq (Correct)

(Corrects general's last name in first paragraph.)

Karbala, Iraq, April 14 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Army found 11 mobile, chemical-biological laboratories buried in the ground near Karbala, Iraq, Cable News Network reported, citing General Benjamin Freakly of the 101st Airborne.

The Army's 2nd Brigade found the 20-foot-by-20-foot (6 meter by 6 meter) metal vans buried in the sand near an artillery factory while fighting in Karbala, Freakly told CNN. About 1,000 pounds (454 kilograms) of documents were found inside the labs, which were clearly marked so they could be found again.

The Army now has to determine how the labs were being used, Freakly told CNN. The U.S. military is conducting a series of tests on the labs to determine if any chemical agents were inside, CNN said.

Other chemicals found by the Army at another site in Iraq last week turned out to be high-grade pesticide after tests were conducted, Freakly told CNN.

<http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=specialreport&sid=a1FEkmb9m6a0&refer=news>

[\(Return to Contents\)](#)